We develop a model of how information flows into a market, and derive algorithms for au tomatically detecting and explaining relevant events. We analyze data from twenty-two "political stock markets" (i.e., betting mar kets on political outcomes) on the Iowa Elec tronic Market (IEM). We prove that, under certain efficiency assumptions, prices in such betting markets will on average approach the correct outcomes over time, and show that IEM data conforms closely to the theory. We present a simple model of a betting market where information is revealed over time, and show a qualitative correspondence between the model and real market data. We also present an algorithm for automatically de tecting significant events and generating se mantic explanations of their origin. The al gorithm operates by discovering significant changes in vocabulary on online news sources (using expected entropy loss) that align with major price spikes in related betting markets.
INTRODUCTION
In markets where items sold have uncertain value, an equilibrium price can be viewed as a summary statis tic reflecting the knowledge of all market players about the item's value. In fact, under common efficiency as sumptions, price is a sufficient statistic for the value of an item, given all evidence known to all participants in the market. In this sense, markets are very effec tive mechanisms for aggregating information that is spread across a population, summarizing that informa tion concisely in the form of (often publicly available) prices.
Gambles are particularly extreme examples of uncertain-value items.1 A gamble (also called a secu rity) pays an amount contingent on some future out come. For example, the gamble "$1 if it rains tomor row" pays $1 if it rains tomorrow, and $0 if it does not rain. If an agent purchases (one unit of) this gamble for $0.3, then the agent wins $1-$0.3=$0.7 if it rains, and loses the $0.3 otherwise. Tomorrow, the value of the gamble will be certain (exactly $1 or exactly $0). But the value of the gamble today depends on the probability of rain tomorrow. In fact, assuming the buyer is risk neutral, the value to the buyer is ex actly his or her subjective probability of rain, since the buyer's expected value is E($1 if RAIN] = Pr(RAIN)·$1 + Pr(NO-RA!N)·$0 = $P r(RA!N).
Most hypotheses about the efficiency of markets as sume that information is incorporated into market prices virtually instantaneously, as soon as it becomes available to any trader. Informally, the reasoning is that, if some trader has superior information that al lows him or her to obtain an expected profit at the cur rent price, then he or she will take advantage of the op portunity by appropriately buying or selling, thereby driving prices toward the correct value given the new information.
In this paper, we develop a theory and model of in formation incorporation in markets, and compare our theoretical predictions with real data from twenty-two political "stock markets" (betting markets on politi cal elections) on the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM).2 We present an application where markets can be used as detection devices for significant information events, and parallel text streams (e.g., newsgroups or news media) can be mined to give semantic explanations of the events.
In Section 2, we give necessary background informa-tion and introduce notation. In Section 3, we present results of a large-scale analysis of the IEM. In Sec tion 4, we prove that, under certain efficiency assump tions, and without an explicit model of evidence or information, the prices in betting markets will over time converge (in expectation) toward the eventual outcome. For example, the price of "$1 if RAIN " will tend to rise over time in worlds where RAIN is true, as compared to worlds where RAIN is false, accord ing to a very simple relationship that appears to hold on IEM. In Section 5, we give a model of information release and subsequent incorporation in a betting mar ket, and show a strong qualitative correspondence with IEM price dynamics. In Section 6, we present our algo rithm for detecting and explaining information events. The algorithm looks at changes in vocabulary before and after significant market swings by ranking words and phrases according to expected entropy loss. We show that in three cases, the algorithm gives appro priate and meaningful semantic explanations for large price changes. 
BACKGROUND
It is clear that markets often react quickly to the re lease of new and relevant information. For example, on March 11, 2002, the stock of Cepheid rose 34% when the company announced it was developing biological hazard detection devices for mail systems. Perhaps the relationship between price and information is no more clear than in betting markets. The current price of a gamble is precisely related to the probabilities of the possible payoffs of the gamble, and any informa tion available that acts as evidence for the possible outcomes should affect the price appropriately accord ing to the rules of Bayesian updates.
The economic theory of mtional expectations (RE) ac counts for information incorporation in markets. RE theory posits that prices reflect the sum total of all in formation available to all market participants (Gross man, 1981; Lucas, 1972) . Even when some agents have exclusive access to inside information, prices equili brate exactly as if everyone had access to all informa tion. The procedural explanation is that prices reveal to the ignorant agents any initially private informa tion; that is, agents learn by observing prices.
Plott et a!. (1997) investigate, in a laboratory set ting, whether parimutuel markets (the type employed at horse races) are able to aggregate information, as postulated by RE theory. In one set of experiments, each subject was given inside knowledge that a subset of horses would definitely not win. Although all sub jects were uncertain as to the outcome, their collective information was enough to identify the winning horse with certainty. Information aggregation did occur, and RE-based predictions fit the data welL Sunder (1982, 1988) and Forsythe and Lund holm (1990) conducted laboratory experiments to test the reasonableness of the RE assumption in the con text of a securities market (essentially a betting market as described in the introduction). In many cases, even when information was distributed asymmetrically ac cross participants (for example, certain traders were given "inside" knowledge or evidence pointing toward particular outcomes), the equilibrium reached reflected the combination of all information, as predicted by RE theory.
Beyond the controlled setting of the laboratory, em piricists have analyzed the accuracy of implied prob ability assessments given by public markets. Per haps the most direct tests involve horse race betting markets. Several studies demonstrate that odds on horses correlate well with the actual frequencies of victory (Thaler & Ziemba, 1988) . Other sports bet ting markets, like the National Basketball Association point spread market, provide very accurate forecasts of likely game outcomes (Gandar, Dare, Brown, & Zu ber, 1998) . Financial options markets (in many ways equivalent to betting markets) yield accurate probabil ity distributions over the future prices of their under lying stocks (Sherrick, Garcia, & Tirupattur, 1996) .
The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) supports trading in securities tied to the outcome of political and finan cial events. Their 1988 market, open only to Univer sity of Iowa students and employees, offered securities that paid off proportionally to the percentage of votes received by various candidates in that year's US Pres idential election. The final prices matched Bush's fi nal percent margin of victory more closely than any of the six major polls (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, & Wright, 1992) . Since opening to the public, subse quent US Presidential election markets have attracted wide participation and following. Other election mar kets have now opened in Canada3 and Austria. 4 We use the logarithmic score to measure accuracy and information incorporation in IEM. The logarith mic score is a proper scoring rule (Winkler & Mur phy, 1968) , and is an accepted method of evaluating probability assessments. When experts are rewarded according to a proper score, they can maximize their expected return by reporting their probabilities truth3http://esm.ubc.ca/ 4http://ebweb.tuwien.ac.at/apsm/ fully. Additionally, more accurate experts can ex pect to earn a higher average score than less compe tent experts. Suppose an expert reports probabilities p1, Ji2, ... ,pk fork mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. Let w; = 1 if and only if the ith event occurs, and w; = 0 otherwise. Then the expert's score for the current event is In ( I;� 1 w;p; ). Higher scores indicate more accurate forecasts, with 0 the maximum and negative infinity the minimum. The "expert as sessments" given by the market are taken to be the (normalized) prices of the candidates.
Note that under the logarithmic scoring rule, an ex pert's expected score equals the entropy of his or her probability distribution. Stated another way, the neg ative of the logarithmic score gives the amount that the expert is "surprised" by the actual outcome. So the logarithmic score applied to IEM is both a measure of forecast accuracy and an information-theoretic mea sure of the amount that the market is surprised when the winners of the elections are finally determined.
2.2

NOTATION
If the probability of event E is Pr(E), then the
We denote a gamble paying off $1 if and only if event E occurs as (E). Let the price of (E) at time t be Pt· In analogy to the defini tions of likelihood and log-likelihood, define the like lihood price as 4 = pt/(1 -Pt) and the log-likelihood price as llt = In 4 = lnpt/(1-Pt)-So, for example, Pr(llt = b[llt-l =a) denotes the probability that the log-likelihood price equals b at time t, given that the log-likelihood price equals a at time t -1. Similarly, the probability that event E occurs given that the like lihood price at time t is a is written as Pr(E[4 = a), etc.
3
EXAMINING THE IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKET
We collected daily prices from twenty-two political election markets on IEM. Markets include the 2000 US Presidential election, the 2000 NY Senate election, and other elections in the US and around the world. In the NY Senate election, for example, traders could buy or sell shares of "$1 if Giuliani wins" , "$1 if H. Clinton wins" , "$1 if Lazio wins" , "$1 if another re publican wins" , "$1 if another democrat wins" , and "$1 if an independent candidate wins" . On IEM, can didates can be sold by first buying the bundle of all candidates from the "bank" for $1 (the bank is guaran teed to exactly break even with this transaction), then
-600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 time Figure 1 : Average logarithmic score of twenty-two election markets on IEM. Higher (less negative) scores reflect increasing accuracy.
selling particular candidates back on the open market. Figure 1 shows the average logarithmic score over time for all twenty-two markets. Time zero is aligned with the last trading day in every market (on or near the corresponding election day), and time -i corresponds with i days before the last trading day for every mar ket. The plot at point -i is an average over all markets that lasted at least i days (fewer and fewer markets are represented toward the left end of the graph). The logarithmic score trends upward over time, indicating that the market's probability assessments are improv ing over time. Put another way, prices tend to move in the direction of the winning candidate. Morover, the increase in logarithmic score is roughly linear over a large portion of the graph, with a rapid rise evident just before time zero. It is important to note that recognizing this trend is only possible after the elec tion outcomes are known, since the logarithmic score computation depends on the actual outcome. The fact that the logarthmic score increases over time does not mean that price movements are predictable before the election outcome is known (in fact, if the market is efficient, prices are not predictable).
The increase in logarithmic score can be attributed to the incorporation of evidential information into the market as it becomes available to traders. The linear increase over much of the graph can be thought of as a manifestion of a roughly constant flow of information on average into the markets. We discuss interpreta tions of the increase in logarithmic score in terms of our theory and model in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
4
THEORY OF INFORMATION INCORPORATION
We first make some efficiency assumptions, then prove consequences for price dynamics in betting markets like IEM. We begin with a basic assumption about the accuracy of market prices as probability assessments.
Assumption 1 (Forecast accuracy) Let Pt be the price of (E) at time t. Then
Assumption 1 says that the market price today is an accurate assessment of the probability of E, indepen dent of any past prices. To see why Assumption 1 is reasonable, imagine for a moment that a betting mar ket existed where Assumption 1 did not hold. Then a trader whose probability assessments are more accu rate than the market's could earn a consistent profit (in expectation). But that trader's actions would act precisely to "correct" the market assessment, driving prices so as to make Assumption 1 true. RE theory essentially assumes that no individual trader has more accurate probability assessments than the market.
Theorem 1 Assumption 1 implies the following con sequences:
1.
2.
3.
where E[· ] is the expectation operator, not to be confused with the event E. That is, prior to know ing the outcome of E, the expected price at time t equals the price at time t -1 {i.e., the a priori expected change in price is zero).
That is, the log-likelihood price is e' times as likely to go up by E in worlds where E is true as it is to go up by E in worlds where E is false.
Pr(/11 =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) = ea + 1 --,-------: -Pr(llt =a+ E!llt-1 =a)
ea + e ' That is, the log-likelihood price is ( ea + 1) / ( ea + e -') times as likely to go up from a to a + E in worlds where E is true as it is to go up from a to a + E in worlds where the state of E is unknown.
That is, the expected price at time t in worlds where E is true is greater than the price at time t -1 by an amount proportional to the variance of price.
Proof. We begin by proving item #1. By Assump tion 1 and Bayes' rule,
Next we prove item #2. Applying Bayes' rule using log-likelihood notation, we get:
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a)
Applying Assumption 1, we get:
Next we prove item #3. Summing over possible worlds (E and E), we get:
Pr(/11 = a+ EjE, llt-1 = a) -1 -+ea
Dividing both sides by Pr(llt = a+ EJE, llt-1 =a) and substituting in the relation from item #2, we get:
Finally, we prove item #4. We make use of a version of item #3 stated in terms of ordinary prices (as opposed to log-likelihood prices):
a Using this equation and the definition of expectation, we can show that:
a From the definition of variance and the result of item #1, we know that:
Putting the last two equations together, we have the desired result:
+ a a Figure 2 shows the distribution of changes in log likelihood ( t = lit -lit-!) measured across all twenty two IEM markets.5 The distribution is nearly symmet ric (a positive increase in log-likelihood oft is almost exactly as likely as a decrease of t), consistent with item #1 of Theorem 1. The plot of Figure 2 aligns almost exactly with the mirror plot of the distribution of -£ = li t-! -li t . In fact symmetry is a stronger condition than is provable from Assumption 1 alone; symmetry implies zero expected change (item # 1 of Theorem 1) , but not vice versa. Interestingly, the dis tribution of t follows a power law over several orders of magnitude. Future work may investigate whether other natural efficiency assumptions can explain the symmetric and power-law behavior of observed distri butions. Figure 3 shows the frequency of changes of t for candi dates that eventually won divided by the frequency of changes oft for candidates that eventually lost, over a range oft. The solid line plots e ' as predicted by item #2 of Theorem 1; the fit is reasonably close.
5The distribution density is estimated by measuring the cumulative distribution, then approximating the derivative at the ith largest e by (y;-so-YHso)/(x;_50-xHso), where X; is the value of the ith largest e and y; is the cumulative distribution at that point. Figure 2: Distribution of changes t in log-likelihood price measured over twenty-two election markets on IEM.
Figure 3: Distribution of changes t in log-likelihood price for winning candidates divided by changes t for losing candidates, on a linear-log scale. The line corre sponds to e ' , the theoretically predicted relationship.
The fact that the logarithmic score tends to increase over time as seen in Figure 1 can be explained using items #2, #3, and #4 of Theorem 1. According to the definition of logarithmic score, the figure shows the average of the logarithm of the price of the winning candidates. Items #2 and #3 state that the prices of the winning candidates should go up faster on average than the prices of losing candidates, or the prices of all candidates taken together (assuming that there is at least some variation in prices). Item #4 describes the nature of the expected increase most directly. The expected increase in price from one time step to the next (in worlds where E is true) is equal to the variance in price at that time divided by the price. As long as the variance of price is nonzero (i.e., as long as prices have some probability of changing), then there will be an expected increase in price as time moves forward. The following corollary (the proof is immediate from item #4 of Theorem 1) establishes that prices provably trend toward the correct outcome over time.
Corollary 1 Assuming some positive variance of fu ture price Pt given the current price Pt-l = a {that is, Var (pt!Pt -1 =a)> 0}, then:
That is, the expected future price is greater than the current price in worlds where E is true.
Item #3 of Theorem 1 can also be used to obtain more specific results regarding the average logarithmic score, if more information is known about the apriori distri bution of E, for example, if we know that the distribu tion is a power law.
5
MODEL OF INFORMATION INCORPORATION
The previous section showed that several properties of the dynamics of betting markets can be explained with very simple assumptions. The increase in logarithmic score observed on IEM is implied once we assume ac curacy and variability of prices; no notion of evidence or information is explicitly needed. In this section, we seek to model information directly, and examine the resulting effect on price dynamics.
We model the event E as the occurrence of ln/21 or more tails in a series of n fair coin flips. We model the release of information as the revelation of the outcomes of one of more coin flips. At time t = 0, the process begins with some apriori knowledge: i0 tails have oc curred out of ko trials. From that point on-from time t = 1 to time t = n -k-one coin is revealed per time step. At any given time t, it tails have occurred out of kt trials in total (including the initial i0 out of k0).
.Q w ·0.8
-600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 time Figure 4 : Average logarithmic score of twenty-two sim ulated markets using the coin flip model.
In order for E to occur, I n/21 -it more tails need to occur in the remaining n -kt trials. So at time t, the probability of the event E occurring is:
We again make Assumption 1 that Pt = Pr(Eiit. kt), or, as in RE theory, all information known at time t is incorporated into the price at time t. Figure 4 shows the average logarithmic score computed over twenty-two "markets" simulated according to (1) with io = ko = 0 and n = 1200. The figure show the price at every other time step; this corresponds to two coin flips per day when comparing with the IEM graph of Figure 1 . We see a similar qualitative pattern of vari ability, roughly linear increase over a large period of time, and rapid increase near the end. This suggests that the dynamics of prices on IEM can be rationalized as resulting from a process where information is incor porated at roughly a constant rate on average across all markets. There are also discernible differences be tween Figures 1 and 4: for example, the variability of IEM prices appears greater than in the model.
6
DETECTING AND EXPLAINING
INFORMATION EVENTS
Previous sections characterized the process of infor mation incorporation in betting markets. In this sec tion, we examine the possibility of using markets to detect significant information events and explain them using alternate textual sources. As a proof of concept, we present a semi-automatic procedure (which we be lieve is fully automatable) for monitoring markets and extracting explanations from newsgroups and official news outlets. We present results from three markets: two from !EM and one from the Foresight Exchange, 6 a market game that operates like a betting market (much like !EM), except that all transactions are us ing play money. Our previous studies show that play money market games behave in many ways like real markets (Pennock, Lawrence, Giles, & Nielsen, 2001a; Pennock, Lawrence, Nielsen, & Giles, 2001b) .
The three markets examined were: (1) candidate Giu liani in the 2000 US NY Senate election, (2) candi date Gore in the 2000 US Presidential election, and (3) the outcome "extraterrestrial life discovered by 2050" (XLif) as defined on the Foresight Exchange.7 Note that in market (2), the winning bet was defined as the candidate with the largest share of the popular vote, not the winner of the electoral college, so Gore was the eventual winning bet.
We characterized daily price fluctuations in the three markets using the difference between log-likelihood prices from one day to the next. We identified days on which exceptionally large differences were observed. We found the following dates to be pivotal dates, im mediately following huge price swings: document sets using expected entropy loss (Glover, Flake, Lawrence, Birmingham, Kruger, Giles, & Pen nock, 2001 ). We do not explicitly remove stop words. Instead, we remove all features that occur in less than 7.5% of the positive documents, we re move all dates and numbers, and we manually re move source-specific words (e.g., "google" and "Wash ington Post" ). We then rank keywords by expected entropy loss as follows. Entropy is computed in dependently for each feature. Let P be the event that a document is in the positive set. Let f de note the event that the document contains the spec ified feature (e.g., contains the word "meteorite" ).
The prior entropy of the class distribution is e = -Pr(P) lgPr(P)-Pr(P) lgPr(P). The posterior en tropy of the class when the feature is present is e1 = -Pr(Pif) lgPr(Pif)-Pr(Pif) lgPr(Pjf); like wise, the posterior entropy of the class when the feature is absent is e f = -Pr(Pi/) lgPr(Pi/) Pr(Pif) lg Pr(PI/). Thus, the expected posterior en tropy is e 1 Pr(f) + e f Pr(f), and the expected entropy loss is e -{ e 1 Pr(f) + e f Pr(f)) . If any of the prob abilities are zero, we use a fixed value instead of 0 in the equations. Expected entropy loss is synonymous with expected information gain, and is always nonneg ative. Features are sorted by expected entropy loss to provide an approximation of the usefulness of the in dividual feature. This approach will correctly assign low scores to features that, although common in both sets, are unlikely to be useful for a binary classifier.
Results are shown in the Tables 1, 2 , and 3. The pro cedure did extract many words and phrases which are closely associated with real incidents happening dur ing the identified dates with major implications for the Again reasonable explanatory terms and phrases were dis covered using our algorithm. Both the Usenet results ("lazio", "rick lazio" , "mayor" , "voted" ) and Wash ington Post results ( "lazio" , "rick lazio" , "rick" , "rep rick", "rep rick lazio" ) indicate the name of Lazio as a top ranked feature. Words like "drop" , "dropped" , "quit" , and "bow out" did appear in the positive doc uments, but were removed during thresholding. We believe that more intelligent use of stemming and syn onyms would help in this situation where there are many ways to say the same thing (as opposed to the case of "prostate cancer" , where there is essentially only one way to say it).
In the US Presidential election, the price of candidate Gore skyrocketed after the election when it became clear he won the popular vote. The near tie and result ing chaos in counting the ballots in Florida appear in our extracted keyword list, where the top ranked fea tures are "florida" , "ballots" , "recount" , "palm beach" etc.
On August 6, 1996, NASA announced it had discov ered possible signs of life on a Martian meteorite. The price of a bet on XLif on the Foresight Exchange rose quickly, apparently in response. Indeed our algorithm found very relevant explanatory features, as listed in Table 3 . 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the mechanism of informa tion incorporation in betting markets. We developed a theory based on simple efficiency assumptions that explains the increase in forecast accuracy over time ob served in real betting markets. We proposed a simple coin-flipping model of information flow into a market and demonstrated a qualitative correspondence with real data. We designed an algorithm for detecting in formation events in real markets and explaining them by extracting features from online text sources. In three case studies, our algorithm found key words and phrases subjectively very relevant to the events of the day corresponding to sharp market upswings or down swings.
